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Rhodes and Brandone (2014) have shown
evidence of limited theory of mind in
3-year old children. The study was based
on a false belief procedure in which an
observer [E1] saw a toy hidden in loca-
tion 1, then it was moved to location 2.
E1 observed the move in the true belief
(TB) test but not in the false belief (FB)
test. Then the child was assessed for under-
standing of E1’s belief about the toy. In the
FB test E1 should falsely believe the toy
was still at location 1, whereas in the TB
test E1 would know the toy was at loca-
tion 2. In the action condition the child
was asked to open the door where E1
would enter to retrieve the toy, whereas in
the verbal condition the child was asked
where E1 thought the toy was. Participants
performed above chance in both TB and
FB tests in the action condition but in
the verbal condition they performed above
chance in the TB test only. Rhodes and
Brandone (2014) interpret correct perfor-
mance in the action condition as reflect-
ing implicit theory of mind whereas in
the verbal condition it is interpreted as
explicit.
We accept the empirical findings and
agree that the action condition represents
a lower level of understanding than the
verbal condition. However in their effort
to operationalize the implicit—explicit
distinction they have also manipulated
cognitive complexity. Therefore, we sug-
gest that the study can be interpreted
in terms of some deeper theoretical con-
structs. Specifically, it has recently been
proposed that children acquire the begin-
nings of symbolic processes at approx-
imately 1 year of age (Halford et al.,
2013). However, structure is necessary
to give symbols meaning, and relations
are the essence of structure (Halford
et al., 2010). Relational representations are
subject to the effect of cognitive com-
plexity, which can be quantified by the
number of entities bound in a represen-
tation (Halford et al., 2007). Relational
representations vary from unary, such as
dog (Fido) to binary, such as larger (ele-
phant, mouse), to ternary such as add
(3, 2, 5) and quaternary such as pro-
portional (3, 6, 4, 8). Approximate age
norms are 1 year, 1½years, 5 years, and 11
years for unary, binary, ternary and qua-
ternary relations respectively. Theory of
mind as assessed in the verbal condition
entails ternary relational processes which
is one possible reason why success is usu-
ally not observed until 5 years, whereas
2-year olds exhibit binary relational the-
ory of mind in the form of connec-
tions and transformations tests (Andrews
et al., 2003). Our proposal therefore would
be that the 3-year olds were employ-
ing symbolic processes of low relational
complexity.
All participants passed control tests
designed to assess their knowledge of:
Where the toy was left, where it was after it
was moved, and whether E1 had observed
themove. These propositions are sufficient
for the verbal FB test. Thus if E1 sees the
toy at location 1, but does not know it was
moved, E1 will (falsely) believe the toy is
at location 1. On the other hand if E1 saw
the move E1 will know the toy is at loca-
tion 2. The 3-year olds all answered the
three control questions correctly (albeit
only on the second test in some cases). So
the question is why, given that they had
the relevant knowledge, did the children
not demonstrate theory of mind in the ver-
bal condition? We suggest that the reason
is the cognitive complexity of the verbal
FB task, as demonstrated by Andrews et al.
(2003). The false belief test entails relating
three variables; where the toy was hid-
den first, the nature of the transformation,
and the observer’s representation of the
toy’s location. This is ternary relational
and successful performance was associated
with other ternary relational tasks includ-
ing transitive inference and class inclusion.
Therefore, it would be expected that 3-year
olds, even though they correctly answered
the three control questions, would not suc-
ceed in the verbal false belief test because
they could not construct a cognitive repre-
sentation that integrated the three relevant
variables.
Why then could they pass the action
false belief test? We propose that the action
test could be passed by the simpler pro-
cess of representing where E1 last saw
the toy. In the FB test E1 last saw the
toy at location 1, and therefore will go
there to retrieve it. However, in the TB
test E1 last saw the toy at location 2, and
therefore will attempt to retrieve it there.
Both these responses would yield correct
scores, and the proportions correct indi-
cate children recognized a link between
E1’s movement (which door E1 will enter
by) and where E1 last saw the toy. Notice
however that it does not unequivocally
demonstrate that children recognize E1’s
awareness of the toy’s location. Either way,
it can be performed by the child’s rep-
resenting a relation between the location
where E1 last saw the toy and either E1’s
retrieval action, or E1’s representation of
the location:
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Child’s representation (E1 last-seen
location; E1 retrieval-action)
Or
Child’s representation (E1 last-seen
location; E1 representation-of-location)
In either form this is a binary rela-
tion which is easily within the processing
capacity of typical 3-year olds (Andrews
et al., 2003).
An explanation based on the verbal
nature of the explicit false belief test is
implausible because the children passed
the control questions which were also ver-
bal. It also begs the question why verbal
processes are harder. Our suggestion is that
relational complexity affects both reason-
ing and language (Andrews et al., 2006)
so both verbal and action performances
will be subject to complexity effects. The
question: “Where does E1 think the toy
is?” would elicit a more complete repre-
sentation that more closely resembles the
representation elicited by traditional false
belief tasks in which three variables are
related:
Child’s representation (where E1 saw
toy hidden; nature of transformation; E1’s
representation of location).
We agree that the action performance
is consistent with implicit cognition, but
we also suggest it is symbolic, and it is
performed correctly because it is struc-
turally simple. Relational complexity has
been found to be a powerful explana-
tory concept in infant, child, adult and
animal cognition (Halford et al., 2007,
2014). In the context of theory of mind
it implies that implicit (action) theory of
mind should be related to many other
tasks of similar complexity, including in
other domains such as the balance scale
and categorical syllogisms. Explicit theory
of mind should be related to other ternary
relational tasks such as transitive inference
and class inclusion.
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